

28 February 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
STATINTL  
FROM : [REDACTED]  
SUBJECT : Format for State Meeting - 28 February 1978

You will be met on arrival at State by Bill Sergant, State, L.A. Division; he will be your escort officer while there. The meeting will be in a large conference room, attended by 30-40 people. A list of those ambassadors that will be present is attached. You will be seated at a "T" shaped table, next to [REDACTED] They have asked you to speak for approximately 15 minutes. You will be followed by two L.A. ambassadors who will speak for about 15 minutes (total). The remaining 15-30 minutes is set aside for discussion.

STATOTHR

Very respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John".

attachment

Paul H. Boehler - Bogota Asencio Degio, Columbia  
Davis E. Boster - Guatemala  
John R. Burke - Georgetown, Guyana  
Paul Castro - Buenos Aires, Argentina  
Edward Corr - Quito, Ecuador  
John H. Crimmins - Brazilia  
Frank J. Devene - San Salvador  
Richard J. Fox - Port of Spain, Trinidad  
John Gawf - Belize, British Honduras  
Robert Hurwitch - Santo Fomingo, Dominican Republic  
Robert Irving - Kingston, Jamaica  
Mari-Luci Jaramillo - Tegucigalpa, Honduras  
William Jones - Port au Prince, Haiti  
William Jorden - Panama  
Lyle Lane - Havana, Cuba  
George Landow - Santiago, Chile  
Patrick Lucey - Mexico City  
Frank Pritz - Bridgetown, Barbados  
Grover Penberthy - Curacao  
Lawrence Pezzullo - Montevideo, Uruguay  
Howard Robertson - Martinique  
William Schwartz - Nassau  
Harry Shlaudeman - Lima, Peru

Mauicio Solaun - Managua, Nicaragua

Viron Veky - Caracas, Venezuela

Robert White - Asuncion, Paraguay

Owen Zurkellen - Paramaribo, Surinam

Marvin Weissman - San Jose, Costa Rica

LA CHIEFS OF MISSION

28 February 1978

I. Two major steps evolution of intell

1. 30 years ago - Sov - mil

- US dominant political power

independent economic power

only threat: Soviet military

- Policy makers interested in

o Soviet activities elsewhere

o Covert action capability

Iran 53, Guatemala 54,

Cuba 60's [REDACTED]

25X1C

- World changed

More countries -

L.A. import

More topics

Econ, narcotics - of interest to you in L.A.

2. Tech revolution needed to complement

More HUMINT

Open

Covert

II. Open

↓ DCD in U.S.

No solution in field

e.g., US businesses

*Embassies?*  
*Example - oil*

## 2 Embassy role

Need way transmitting requirements w/o coopting foreign service

### Suggestions

Don't want to pay price/risk of covert if overt available -  
but must make Embassies aware of needs -

FOCUS exercise? effective?  
(explain)

STATINTL

### III. Covert - How dovetail w/Embassy overt

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Fundamentally, the role of the Station, or [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is to collect needed foreign intelligence  
which cannot be acquired from open sources and which for  
various reasons is denied to US officials abroad. Examples:

*RISK  
COST*

1. -- The intentions and capabilities of governments  
in denied areas -- primarily the USSR, Communist  
Bloc countries, Cuba, China, etc. This means  
that the Station in your country may be expending  
considerable time and effort on these high  
priority targets even though this nets you very  
little, if any, local political intelligence  
to assist you in the accomplishment of your  
mission. The same is true of other third-country  
information.
2. -- The intentions of terrorists. Since terrorists  
operate in a clandestine fashion, only by  
clandestine means can their plans be discovered.

3. -- The same is true of narcotics traffickers whose activities so harm the U.S. CIA collects strategic info on narcotics, not tactical. We report such things as local government policy toward poppy cultivation. DIA works at the tactical level.

4. -- Political and economic information deliberately withheld from U.S. officials by the host government. Foreign governments, protecting their own national interests, will sometimes withhold from the U.S. Ambassador and his staff political and economic information which the U.S. considers important or even vital to have. This could concern the host government's plans to embark on a nuclear weapons program, tactics they plan to use in negotiations with the U.S., new tax laws designed to avoid just recompense to U.S. investors, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]. Political and economic intelligence, collectible only by the Station, is frequently fragmentary but essential to understand the true motives, exact timing, or the tactics of the host government in an initiative it plans which could affect the U.S.

STATINTL

Usually the Station provides a missing piece or pieces to a puzzle for which the Embassy has already supplied and assembled most of the picture. There should not be a duplication of effort. Thus, the Station is not in competition with the Embassy, it is part of the team.

IV. Bear in mind also - DCI Intell Advisor to President

Policy free advice

Hope COS privy to your views

I'll call on him

In D.C. dedicated to divergent analyses/interpretation --

INR vs FNAC

I will encourage COS's to hold to divergent views w/Ambas.

Keep you posted -- but neither clear nor alter position.

Finally - must

Prepare for future

Lay seeds for next government

After all we are defenders of status quo and in much world it's got problem, esp. L.A.

Covert action - controls - Perspectives

Risks --

Yes

But long run

But less than estimate

World leaders are realistic


We're good -- getting better

Reductions

V. Conclusion

- 1) Criticality Human reporting
- 2) Criticality Open reporting
- 3) Criticality Emb. reporting

(for finished intel - L.A. only)



25X1B

However -

- Each compliments the other
- Even a low return figure may include that info critical to understanding the problem

Tell COS - Look in eye - tell can't  
tell

Doors -

PRC -

Task

Cover  
FSOR  
Morale

Fired  
Congress  
covert

Post  
Diff interpret  
Untruth - unjustify  
Guidelines